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While
no dou b l judges
and
d is in le re s ied observ ers have eh a ra e len s i
u
s
ap p ro p r ia te lo sueh s tance s , they can n o t
be
those necessary lor a person ol
virtue. For it is morally necessary, if one is to
have ch a ra c te r o r to
be
a person
of virtue, that it be one’s
own
character. Therefore, an ethic of
v ir tue seem s
to entail a refusal to ignore the status of the agent’s “subjectivity"’ for
moral
formation and behavior. Even as integrity requires that one be faithful
to
personal history, so the development of a person of virtue mandates
be in^
faithful to a community’s history. Exactly because an ethic of virtue has
such
a stake in the agent’s perspective, it is profoundly committed to the existence
of communities convinced that their future depends on the development
of
and trust in persons of virtue.
From “Virtue” by Stanley Hauerwas, in
Powers That Make Us Human: The Founda
tions of Medical Ethics
, edited by Kenneth Vaux. Urbana and Chicago: University ol
Illinois Press,
©
1985 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.