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Technology and Pregnancy Enhancement
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give up one’s rights for the sake of another. This viewpoint appeals to the
example of Jesus who put aside his divine prerogatives in order to fulfill his
mission and die on the cross (Phil. 2:7, 8). On the basis of this example and
the New Testament emphasis, a case could be made for practices involving
donor sperm or egg within the context of marriage.
Modern technological capabilities allow a married person, motivated by
the desire to facilitate the wish of one’s spouse to give birth to biological off
spring, to choose willingly to set aside his or her “right” to be the sole means
whereby the spouse is able to become a parent. And this can be done with
out introducing the physical act of adultery into the marital relationship.
Thus, a husband could choose to allow the technological introduction of
the sperm of another male so that his wife may become the biological
mother of the child they welcome into their marriage. Or a wife might con
sent to the introduction of the egg from another woman, for the sake of
allowing her husband to be the biological father of their child. This decision
need not be viewed as consent to an intrinsically unethical act, for the intro
duction of the sperm or egg of another occurred apart both from any
intended or actual physical act of marital unfaithfulness. It is the absence of
both intent and act that sets the technological process apart from situations
in which actual sexual intercourse involving a third party is employed to
bring about conception.
The technological introduction of a third person into the procreation pro
cess is not unethical, insofar as it does not constitute a violation of the mar
ital bond. Nevertheless, other difficulties potentially arise from the proce
dure. These ought to be considered by any couple contemplating the use of
such methods of technological procreation.
Several potential difficulties are psychological in nature. The knowledge
ihat the new life was produced by neither their physical nor genetic union
may make it difficult for one or the other of the spouses to extend full accep-
lance to the child. Similarly, the fact that one partner, but not the other, was
able to be involved in the procreative process could result in feelings of guilt
o r
incompetency10 that potentially place undue and lasting strain on the
marriage relationship.
The potential for legal complications is likewise present. For example, the
question of progenitorship could become a factor should the trauma of the
experience eventually lead to marital breakdown and divorce. In such a sit
uation would each spouse continue to view the child as his or her own? And
how would the attitude of each of the parties affect the divorce settlement?
I .ikewise, the introduction of other persons into the procreative process
introduces questions concerning the legal status of all such persons, which
10. See I.ori R. Andrews, “ Your s, Mine and T h e i r s , ”
Psychology ioday
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