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“subject for the Lord’s sake to every human institution, whether it be
to the emperor as supreme, or to governors as sent by him
to punish
those who do wrong and praise those who do right”
(I pet 2-13-14)
The sentence which follows suggests that the author believed that the
persecution which was being waged against the believers would stop
once it had become clear that Christians were neither lawless nor
rebellious and that their only crime was that of being Christians He
wrote: “For it is God’s will that by doing right you should put to
silence the ignorance of foolish men” (I Pet. 2:15). Hence, because
of the importance of the state as a dike against anarchy, Christians
not only might but indeed ought to obey the civil authorities except
in those instances where it was impossible to obey the laws of men
without at the same time disobeying the commandments of God. In
the latter cases they were to endure the injustices of the present
order patiently and accept the consequences of disobedience even if
this meant martyrdom, for the end of the present age would soon
come.
R
espons ible
P
articipation
in
D
emocratic
G
overnment
No t
only is there a vast difference between the
situation
which
is
presupposed by the prophetic demand for political reform and that
which provides the background for the writing of the New Testament,
but the latter situation also differs greatly from that which prevails
in our own day in democratic countries where the authorities are at
least in some degree responsible to the people and in which Christian
citizens do have political power. Where such democratic forms of
government do exist, the concepts of acceptance of the ruling author
ities and obedience to them are by themselves
inadequate
to define
the duties of citizens in relation to their rulers. Under such circum
stances the
particular
rulers can no longer meaningfully be under
stood as exercising their authority by divine appointment except in a
very general sense.2 To be sure, the state may still be viewed as
existing by divine appointment, and the democratic process of govern
ment whereby the people appoint particular rulers may
be
considered
providential; but the people themselves are responsible in some meas
ure at least for the specific government which is in power at a
particular time.
p I a i ^ nnC „ Bennett’
Th£ ChHSlian AS Ci‘ken’
New York( Association
The Political Order
313