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Blit in the m o d e rn w o rld , where there is no con s en su s co n c c rm n i’ hum an
good indeed, such
a
consensus is forbidden by the belief
tha t the ind iv idual
is free to determine what is good for him/her—it is not possible
for e th ics to
be justified in a united end for human life. If some conception
o f
an
end lor
humanity is proposed for modern society, such as freedom or happiness, h
quickly becomes apparent that such a notion of the “good” has little
ethical
content. For our society is based on the view that freedom involves the
free
dom to determine what form one’s individual happiness will take. But
then
“happiness” as an end or goal for human life offers no practical guidance
for
the conduct of human life.
The contemporary ethical movement often called “virtue ethics” is a call
to address the fragmentation of ethics in the modern world with a return to
something like the classical-medieval view that ethics is primarily the science
of developing human character through the fostering of the virtues. Stanley
Hauerwas, now at Duke University, is the primary proponent of virtue ethics
as a viable approach to Christian ethics. In the rest of this paper I will exam
ine Hauerwas’ proposals for a Christian ethic structured along the lines sug
gested by virtue ethics.
Being and Doing
One of the characteristics of the modern ethical situation is, suggests
Hauerwas, an excessive concern with ethical dilemmas or quandaries.2Eth-
icists are asked to help us decide whether or not to have an abortion, whether
to lie to protect someone’s feelings, or whether to tell a terminally ill patient
that she is dying. The focus on such dilemmas leads us to believe that ethics
is primarily concerned with making decisions, usually difficult decisions. . . .
Hauerwas argues that the concern for ethical dilemma is symptomatic of
the modern concern that ethics be both, somehow, individual yet univer
sally applicable. In concern for the general applicability of ethical principles
we focus on the character of a decision as such. Is the act of abortion, as
such, an act of murder? If so, then we may develop a general moral principle
that abortion is wrong. But that approach to decision-making ignores the
fact that decisions have a history. The history of the decision is the life of the
person deciding and the life of the community in which that person lives.
Either history may render it impossible for the individual to embrace that
upon which the principle that abortion is wrong is based, i.e., that abortion
is murder.
So Hauerwas maintains that there is a question which is prior to “What
shall I do?” That question deals with the character and history which is the
2.
Stanley Hauerwas,
The Peaceable Kingdom
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1983), 4.