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Janet Dickey McDowell
or discouraged), it is clear that this objection does not necessarily apply to
present procedures, especially those used in U.S. clinics. Respect for human
life at its very earliest stages is not inherently incompatible with in vitro fer
tilization and thus need not be the basis for opposing the technique.
It seems, then, that IVF is not inherently immoral. When employed to
facilitate conception by loving couples, it is no more problematic than an
artificial fallopian tube would be. The abuse of fertilized ova is not necessar
ily an element of the procedure, and those who would object on grounds of
unnaturalness must be prepared to reject other medical interventions that
bypass pathological conditions. Conceptions via IVF ought not simply to be
tolerated; they should be celebrated, for they enable otherwise infertile cou
ples to join in passing along the gift of life.
Nevertheless, future procedures relying in part on the IVF technique may
pose moral dilemmas. Two in particular, embryo transfer (the insertion of a
fertilized ovum into the uterus of a woman who did not provide the ovum)
and ova and embryo banking (stockpiling frozen ova and fertilized ova), are
being quietly attempted in Australia and perhaps elsewhere. Whereas IVF
as currently practiced aids in the establishment of genetically connected
families, these new applications run significant risks of confusing lineage,
distorting traditional family structures, and/or depersonalizing human
reproduction.
Defenders of ova and embryo banking argue that it need not be used in
tandem with embryo transfer to a nondonor woman. They contend that fro
zen ova, fertilized or not, would merely be stored until such time as the
donor chose to use them. Theoretically this would reduce the need for mul
tiple surgeries to recover ova when implantation does not take place and the
procedure must be repeated. This use of ova/embryo banks raises no objec
tions not already discussed herein with regard to the basic IVF technique.
However, embryo transfer in combination with ova banking or embryo
banking could be used in a variety of circumstances. For example, in the case
of a woman with healthy ovaries but uterine disease (or the absence of a
uterus) such that she could not carry a child, embryo transfer would make it
possible for her to have her ovum removed, fertilized, then transferred to the
uterus of another woman. This “genuine surrogate” would experience preg
nancy and birth, and after birth the child would be surrendered to its genetic
parents.
For another example, a woman with a healthy uterus who did not wish to
have her own ovum fertilized (perhaps for eugenic reasons) could elect to
have an ovum provided by an anonymous donor fertilized with her partner’s
sperm and then transferred to her uterus. Or she could choose to have an
already fertilized ovum inserted. Using a donated unfertilized ovum would
be strongly analogous to artificial insemination by an anonymous donor;