Versión de HTML Básico
Ethical Implications of In Vitro Fertilization
67
employing the services of an embryo bank has been likened to very early
adoption.
What objections might be raised to the genuine surrogate application of
IVF and embryo transfer? Primarily, one must be concerned with the atti
tude such a practice would engender toward the surrogate. Would she view
herself merely as an incubator-for-hire, or be viewed in that light by those
who employ her? Probably—perhaps even certainly. It would, in fact, be
almost imperative for the surrogate to see herself in this way in order to
maintain an emotional distance during pregnancy and thus be able to sur
render the child at birth. She would have to guard zealously against viewing
herself as a “mother,” as more than a temporary “repository” for someone
else’s child. Do Christians wish to encourage women to perceive procreative
capacities as mere services available for hire?
Further, an impersonal, businesslike attitude toward the surrogate on the
part of the genetic parents seems crucial to a successful surrogate arrange
ment, unless the couple genuinely welcomes ongoing third-party involve
ment in their family life. The couple would seem to have only two choices:
viewing the surrogate simply as a means to their reproductive end, or creat
ing a new form of extended family. While the latter choice is not unthinkable
(and perhaps not undesirable), the former is more likely. One must ask
whether Christians wish to be the sort of people who treat one another in this
way; the answer seems clearly negative. The kind of interactions among the
primary parties necessary to make the genuine surrogate situation work are
not those fostered by Christian values. It would be difficult (though not
impossible) to structure a surrogate situation in such a way that people are
fully respected as persons.
Ova banking is, as was suggested earlier, analogous to artificial insemina
tion by donor (AID). Therefore qualms about AID—such as concern about
psychological damage to the noncontributing partner, pseudoadultery, con
fusion of the child’s genetic inheritance, and devaluation of the anonymous
donor—apply also to ova banking. Large numbers of people, many of them
Christian, believe that the potential pitfalls of AID can be avoided through
sensitive counseling and maximum participation by the male partner during
the insemination process. The fact that embryo transfer would enable a
woman to experience pregnancy and the birth of the child (conceived with
an ovum not her own) would ensure in this case an even greater sense of full
contribution to procreation by the partner whose genes are absent. Those
who permit AID should welcome ova banking; those who find AID trouble
some will view ova banking in a similar light.
In contrast to ova banking, embryo banking has some genuinely novel
features features which could well rule out its use. Fundamentally, objec
tions to embryo banking stem from its deliberate creation of nascent life not