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Janet Dickey McDowell
desired by either genetic parent. While unintended conceptions do occur
with some frequency as a result of intercourse, such conceptions are acci
dental—perhaps even tragic—and not normative. And many couples who
conceive unintentionally [,] do, upon reflection, welcome the child. But the
anonymous contributors to a bank will never have such a change of heart.
Presumably they will not even know whether their genetic offspring exist.
The analogy to adoption employed to defend the practice of anonymous
embryo banking (and subsequent transfer) breaks down when one considers
that it induces genetically broken families. The child will never have a
chance to know biological kin. Adoption, in contrast,
copes with
broken bio
logical relations; it does not create them. Such deliberate scrambling of lin
eage seems to serve only the purpose of allowing a couple to experience preg
nancy and birth—a purpose that does not seem sufficiently important to
warrant the possible confusion.
In summary, I have argued that IVF per se is not morally troublesome. It
seems, in fact, to be a positive good in overcoming medical conditions that
preclude procreation by some couples. However, other procedures relying
on the IVF technique are less acceptable. Ova banking ought to be employed
only with the same caution as AID. Genuine surrogate situations seem
acceptable only under very rare circumstances that preserve respect for the
surrogate. And the transfer of embryos provided by anonymous donors
ought virtually to be prohibited altogether.
From Janet Dickey McDowell, “Ethical Implications of In Vitro Fertilization .”
Copyright 1983 Christian Century Foundation. Reprinted by permission from the
October 19, 1983 issue of
The Christian Century.